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I. INTRODUCTION
Amy and Jack work as financial advisors at a national firm. They
both attended the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, graduated in 2000,
and earned a master’s degree while working. Their qualifications and
duties are the same, but Jack’s yearly salary is $100,000 while Amy
earns only $80,000. Amy is not alone. In the United States, on aver-
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age, median earnings of full-time women working year-round are only
80% of men’s earnings.1 Despite explicit prohibition of gender wage
discrimination with the passage of the Equal Pay Act2 (the Act) and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act3 (Title VII) in the early 1960s, the
wage gap4 has persisted and affects most working women in America
across ages, races, states, minority statuses, and education levels.5
The current rate of progress in closing the gap is slow and experts do
not expect women to reach pay equity until 2059.6 Although the wage
gap has narrowed over the past century, its persistence, combined
with Congress’s lack of progress in eliminating pay inequality, indi-
cates deficiencies in the law.
In 1963, Congress enacted the Act to end wage discrimination
based on sex and promote the principle of equal pay for equal work.7
In the 1980s—years after the Act’s passage—gender wage discrimina-
tion began to consistently decrease. Improvement in narrowing the
wage gap stalled again in 2000 and has since stagnated.8 The persis-
tent gap is attributable not only to overt gender discrimination, but
also to non-discriminatory factors, including differences in experience
1. See Alexandra N. Phillips, Comment, Promulgating Parity: An Argument for a
States-Based Approach to Valuing Women’s Work and Ensuring Pay Equity in the
United States, 92 TUL. L. REV. 719, 720 (2018) (citing ELISE GOULD ET AL., ECON.
POL’Y INST., WHAT IS THE GENDER PAY GAP AND IS IT REAL? THE COMPLETE GUIDE
TO HOW WOMEN ARE PAID LESS THAN MEN AND WHY IT CAN’T BE EXPLAINED
AWAY (2016)). In the course of an average working woman’s lifetime, this
amounts to a deprivation of approximately $530,000, or $800,000 for a college-
educated woman. Id.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
4. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 721 (explaining the gender wage gap “is a measure
of what women workers are paid relative to their male counterparts.”).
5. See Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage
Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap,
50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 385 (2013). It is important to note that the gender wage gap
affects some women to a greater extent than others. For a discussion on the racial
pay gap coupled with the gender wage gap, see Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work,
77 MD. L. REV. 581, 591–94 (2018). For a discussion on the wage gap by age and
education, see SECTION OF LITIG., AM. BAR ASS’N, EQUAL PAY: IT’S ABOUT TIME
(2013) (citing NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 50 YEARS & COUNTING: THE UNFINISHED
BUSINESS OF ACHIEVING FAIR PAY 2–3 (2013)). This Note acknowledges the dispa-
rate impact of the wage gap on certain classes of women, but focuses on the wage
gap generally, referring to women as a whole.
6. Sabrina L. Brown, Note, Negotiating Around the Equal Pay Act: Use of the “Fac-
tor Other Than Sex” Defense to Escape Liability, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 471, 476 (2017)
(citing The Wage Gap over Time: In Real Dollars, Women See a Continuing Gap,
NAT’L COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, https://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/DZ2P-D6K2] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020)).
7. See discussion infra section II.A.
8. See Bornstein, supra note 5, at 586. Essentially, there has been little to no change
in the wage gap in the past twenty years. Id.
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and occupational segregation into lower-paying jobs.9 Additionally, a
complex combination of implicit and explicit biases against women—
including undervaluation of work historically done by women, wo-
men’s perceived and actual behavior in negotiations, and working
mothers’ perceived role as a caretaker—have contributed to the gen-
der wage gap in less obvious ways.10 The Act simply fails to address
these factors that are not overtly discriminatory. Moreover, it fails to
recognize and account for implicit bias and other contributors to the
wage gap that fall outside the Act’s narrow focus of pay differences
between men and women doing almost identical work. Thus, the Act is
largely ineffective today and the twenty-year stall in progress toward
pay equity begs either for federal legislation amending the Act or
clearer judicial guidance for its interpretation.
A seemingly subtle but significant factor that may affect Amy’s pay
is prior salary. When Amy and Jack interviewed for their current posi-
tions, their employer asked what their last jobs paid. Because women
have historically been paid less than men, Amy can argue her em-
ployer’s reliance on her prior pay to set her current salary is discrimi-
natory. The employer would respond that prior salary information is a
“factor other than sex”—an exception to the Act11—and does not vio-
late the law. Depending on the jurisdiction and the extent to which the
employer relied on Amy’s prior salary to set her current pay at
$80,000 compared to Jack’s $100,000, Amy may prevail.
This Note examines the uncertainty of the Act’s “factor other than
sex” exception. It does so through the lens of the most prominent case
in this area, Rizo v. Yovino,12 in which an employer based an em-
ployee’s starting salary solely upon her prior pay. Part II discusses the
Act, its exceptions, and how the Supreme Court has interpreted it.
Part III examines the majority and concurring opinions in Rizo and
their key differences, as well as the circuit split the decision deepened.
Part IV explains how Rizo has led to uncertainty and left employers
questioning whether they may consider an employee’s prior salary
when determining pay. It argues that a middle-ground approach is the
best way to interpret the law. Finally, Part V concludes that courts
should adopt the middle-ground approach to avoid pitfalls of a cate-
gorical rule and end the perpetuation of the wage gap based upon use
of prior salary. This proposed approach will allow women to take
charge of salary negotiations without systemic discrimination while
granting employers flexibility to conduct business.
9. See DelPo Kulow, supra note 5, at 393.
10. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 725–29.
11. See discussion infra subsection II.A.1.
12. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds, 139 S. Ct.
706 (2019).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Equal Pay Act of 1963
Congress enacted the Act in 1963 to end wage discrimination on
the basis of sex.13 The Act sought to promote an equal-pay-for-equal-
work mantra through a simple purpose: to prohibit employers from
paying men more than women for equal work.14 The Act was adopted
as a solution to the “serious and endemic problem of employment dis-
crimination in private industry”15 that was based on the outdated tra-
dition of men being paid more than women. In Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan,16 the Supreme Court articulated the Act’s purpose by ex-
plaining that Congress sought to remedy “the fact that the wage struc-
ture of ‘many segments of American industry has been based on an
ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society,
should be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the
same.’”17 Therefore, the Act prohibits wage discrimination between
employees based on sex for equal work requiring equal skill, effort,
and responsibility and performed under similar working conditions.18
Overall, the Act serves a “broadly remedial” purpose to prohibit wage
discrimination on the basis of sex.19
In Corning, the Court explained that Congress recognized the con-
cept of equal pay for equal work, but that discussion was not reflected
in a single piece of legislation that employers could understand and
13. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).
14. Id.
15. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
16. Id.
17. Id. Specifically, Congress noted wage differentials based on sex have a depressing
effect on wages and living standards for employees, prevent maximization of la-
bor resources, cause inefficient labor disputes, burden commerce, and are a form
of unfair competition.
18. See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds,
139 S. Ct. 706 (2019); 26 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 269, § 9 (1994).
19. Corning, 417 U.S. at 208. Notably, Title VII did not modify or limit the scope of
the Equal Pay Act. Like the Act, Title VII addresses pay discrimination issues,
but the laws have different applications based on their different goals and reme-
dies. See Ellen M. Bowden, Note, Closing the Pay Gap: Redefining the Equal Pay
Act’s Fourth Affirmative Defense, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225, 230–31
(1994) (explaining the Act focuses on providing equal pay for equal work, while
Title VII generally forbids employment discrimination). Title VII does not super-
sede the Equal Pay Act and was designed to “supplement, rather than supplant,
existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.” See Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48–49 (1974). Although some litiga-
tion and academic analyses consider the interaction between Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act for certain claims, this Note looks at the Equal Pay Act only to
analyze consideration of prior salary as a factor other than sex.
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use to govern themselves.20 By reducing this concept to statute, Con-
gress intended to prohibit wage discrimination on the basis of sex and
set clear rules for the private sector. To establish a cause of action, an
employee bringing a wage discrimination claim under the Act must
show that the employer pays different wages to employees of opposite
sexes for equal work where the jobs require equal skill, equal effort,
equal responsibility, and are performed under similar working
conditions.21
1. The Act’s Four Exceptions
The first section of the Act describes four affirmative defenses, or
exceptions, that allow an employer to pay a member of one sex higher
wages than a member of another sex even if the employee establishes
a cause of action. The Act reads:
[E]xcept where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Pro-
vided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of
this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsec-
tion, reduce the wage rate of any employee.22
These affirmative defenses authorize an employer to justify paying
different wages to members of different sexes when a pay differential
otherwise violates the Act on its face.23 In other words, even when
male and female employees perform substantially equal work, an em-
ployer does not violate the Act when it can prove that a difference in
wages is due to a seniority system, merit system, production earnings
system based upon quantity or quality, or “a differential based on any
other factor other than sex.” This might include, for example, certain
training programs, education, or the employee’s amount of
experience.24
Courts consistently understand and apply the Act’s three straight-
forward exceptions—a seniority system, a merit system, or a produc-
20. See Corning, 417 U.S. at 198–99 (stating the Act “was more readily stated in
principle than reduced to statutory language which would be meaningful to em-
ployers and workable across the broad range of industries covered by the Act.”).
21. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). The Act states:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees
are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions . . . .
Id.
22. Id. (emphasis in original).
23. See Corning, 417 U.S. at 197.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
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tion earnings system. Compensation pursuant to these exceptions
relates to concrete characteristics, such as qualifications, perform-
ance, or experience.25 Some courts have used the term “bona fide”
when analyzing this portion of the Act, determining a pay differential
pursuant to these first three exceptions is permissible because the sys-
tem was not designed to and does not actually discriminate on the
basis of sex.26 Overall, these exceptions are narrow and specific, and
courts can apply them with reasonable consistency.27
Conversely, courts experience widespread confusion and disagree-
ment regarding the fourth exception, “a differential based on any
other factor other than sex . . . .”28 The Supreme Court has deemed
this the catchall exception to the Act because it is far more general
than the previous three.29 With no clear definition or judicial standard
for what constitutes a factor other than sex, this exception has led to
inconsistent outcomes.30
Although the Supreme Court has explained that Congress struc-
tured the Act “to permit employers to defend against charges of dis-
crimination where their pay differentials are based on a bona fide use
25. See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds,
139 S. Ct. 706 (2019). For instance, under the first affirmative defense, a compen-
sation system that pays higher salaries to employees who have been with the
organization longer would be permissible as long as that payment is made pursu-
ant to a bona fide seniority system.
26. See, e.g., Corning, 417 U.S. at 201 (discussing Congress’s intent to “ensure that
wage differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans” would not consti-
tute a violation of the Act); Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520,
525 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining “Congress indicated its intention that only a ‘bona
fide job classification program’ where job-related distinctions underlie the classi-
fications will qualify as a ‘valid defense to a charge of discrimination’” and hold-
ing an employer bears the burden of proving a bona fide, business-related reason
exists to justify the wage differential); Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th
Cir. 1989) (same).
27. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., CLOSING THE “FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX” LOOPHOLE
IN THE EQUAL PAY ACT (2011); see also Peter Avery, Note, The Diluted Equal Pay
Act: How Was It Broken? How Can It Be Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851–53
(2004) (explaining “the defendant may seek refuge under one of three specific
defenses” or a fourth, more general and uncertain factor other than sex affirma-
tive defense).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); see Bridget Sasson, Comment, The Equal Pay Act: Almost
Fifty Years Later, Why Wage Gap Still Exists, 15 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 73, 77 (2012)
(“The appellate courts have interpreted the affirmative defenses differently. The
factor ‘other than sex’ has become a broad catchall defense for any factor that
does not involve sex.”).
29. See Corning, 417 U.S. at 204. Although the other exceptions hold defendants to a
certain standard that requires evidence, there is no clear standard of proof courts
must require for a defendant to prevail under the fourth exception.
30. See Jeanne M. Hamburg, Note, When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed
Standard for the Identification of “Factors Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay
Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1989); Bowden, supra note 19, at 234.
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of ‘other factors other than sex,’”31 it has not clarified what may con-
stitute such a defense. Several points of confusion have arisen from
the meaning of the exception, including, for example, how broadly to
read the exception, whether it covers only job-related factors (or busi-
ness reasons or the like), and whether an employee’s prior salary is a
factor other than sex within the exception. These issues are un-
resolved and the ongoing debate about the provision’s meaning has led
to circuit splits and uncertainty among plaintiff–employees and defen-
dant–employers alike. This Note analyzes Rizo—the case that rede-
fined the “factor other than sex” exception in the Ninth Circuit—and
proposes a different approach to develop a better, uniform under-
standing of the Act.
B. Supreme Court Interpretation of the Equal Pay Act
Although the Supreme Court has only analyzed the Act a handful
of times, its interpretation of the Act’s purpose and procedure is criti-
cally important to reach an understanding of the exception. Still, great
uncertainty remains as to what this exception means. In 1992, the
Court denied certiorari on an opportunity to clarify the “factor other
than sex” defense by determining whether the factor must be sup-
ported by a legitimate business-related reason.32 Since then, the
Court has not considered the increasingly debated question of whether
an employer may use an employee’s prior salary to justify a wage dif-
ferential under the defense.33 Without precedent specifically address-
31. Washington Cty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170–71 (1981).
32. See Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992). In a dissent joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, Justice White explained this
issue presented “an important and clear-cut issue of law that is fundamental to
the further conduct of the case . . . .” Id. Acknowledging the uncertainty and need
for further clarification of this exception, he stated, “I would grant certiorari to
resolve the acknowledged conflict among the Circuits regarding the interpreta-
tion of the federal Equal Pay Act.” Id.
33. The closest the Court has come to addressing this issue was Ledbetter v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbet-
ter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 181, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). In that case,
the petitioner argued a Title VII statute of limitations issue and asserted “Title
VII is violated each time an employee receives a paycheck that reflects past dis-
crimination.” Id. at 640. The Court declined to adjudicate this argument. Id. Con-
gress overturned the case in 2009 with an amendment to Title VII that expanded
the time period during which individuals can bring claims of discriminatory com-
pensation. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 181. Most notable, however, was
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion criticizing the court for its decision. She
explained how using prior pay under Title VII leads to discriminatory pay differ-
entials and stated, “Paychecks perpetuating past discrimination . . . are actiona-
ble . . . because they discriminate anew each time they issue.” Ledbetter, 550 U.S.
at 647. See also Garrett M. Fahy, Note, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
550 U.S. 618 (2007): Faithful to Title VII or Blind to Sex Discrimination?, 2. J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 359, 384–89 (2009) (explaining the same). Al-
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ing this issue, Corning—the Court’s most in-depth analysis of the Act
to date—and Gunther—a more recent look at the Act’s fourth excep-
tion—provide the most significant guidance for lower courts to under-
stand and apply the Act and its ambiguous fourth exception.
1. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan
Corning is the most thorough of the Court’s few discussions of the
Equal Pay Act. As such, it provides important guidance for lower
courts’ analyses of the Act. The plaintiff brought the case because the
Corning manufacturing plant’s night inspectors—who were all male
due to a state law that prohibited women from working at night—
earned significantly higher wages than the all-female day inspectors.
The Court considered whether Corning violated the Act by paying a
higher base wage to male night shift inspectors than female day shift
inspectors performing the same work.34 Corning argued the shift dif-
ferential justified disparate wages and the day and night shift work
were not performed under similar working conditions as defined by
the Act.35 The Court analyzed this issue within the Act’s fourth excep-
tion, holding the differential was not justifiable as a factor other than
sex.36
To decide whether Corning violated the Act, the Court turned to
the Act’s purpose and legislative history.37 Several representatives
and witnesses who testified during hearings for the Act, including a
representative from Corning, noted private employers in America
were using “formal, systematic job evaluation plans to establish equi-
table wage structures in their plants” that accounted for a variety of
factors to determine job value, including wages.38 These individuals
criticized the Act’s drafts for having an “unduly vague and incomplete”
definition of equal work that did not take into account the job evalua-
though this assessment echoes of the prior salary and discrimination issue this
Note addresses, it was directed at Title VII—not Equal Pay Act—litigation.
Therefore, while the Supreme Court has contemplated issues similar to the one
this Note discusses, it has remained silent on whether an employee’s prior salary
can justify a wage differential under the Act’s fourth exception.
34. See Corning, 417 U.S. at 190. This higher wage was paid in addition to a separate
night shift differential the plant paid all employees for night work. To fill the
night shift, the plant moved male workers from day inspection jobs to night in-
spection jobs for which the male workers demanded and received higher wages.
After the law was amended and women were permitted to seek night shift jobs,
male employees retained the same higher wage they demanded when they were
moved to the night shift, while female inspectors’ wages remained lower for both
day and night work. Id. at 190–94.
35. Id. at 197.
36. Id. at 205.
37. See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text (discussing the Act’s intent and
purpose).
38. Corning, 417 U.S. at 199.
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tion systems upon which employers relied.39 This is why, the Court
observed, Congress amended the Act to include equal effort, skill, re-
sponsibility, and similar working conditions within the concept of
equal work.40 Therefore, Congress indicated that a “bona fide job clas-
sification program that does not discriminate on the basis of sex” may
serve as a defense to a charge of discrimination under the Act.41
The Court distinguished the wage differential as compensation for
night work from added payment based upon sex.42 Thus, Corning vio-
lated the Act and could not justify its wage differential as a factor
other than sex because “the higher night rate was in large part the
product of the generally higher wage level of male workers” who de-
manded greater compensation for work that female employees were
performing at a lower base wage rate.43 Notably, the Court rejected
Corning’s market argument—the idea that an employer can pay men
more than women for equal work because men will not work at lower
rates and the wage differential reflects the job market. It clarified that
taking advantage of that market situation is “understandable as a
matter of economics, but its differential nevertheless became illegal
once Congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal
work.”44 Although this holding was influential and has provided lower
courts with some guidance for interpreting the Act, the Court did not
define a standard for what constitutes a factor other than sex, which
contributed to the current state of confusion.
2. Washington County v. Gunther
Seven years after Corning, the Supreme Court analyzed the Act’s
“factor other than sex” exception through a case brought under a Title
VII sex-based wage discrimination claim.45 The Court acknowledged
39. Id. at 202.
40. Id. at 201 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3 (1963), which emphasized that “there
are many factors which may be used to measure the relationships between jobs
and which establish a valid basis for a difference in pay.”).
41. Id. at 201.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 204–05.
44. Id. at 205. For an explanation of the market theory defense, see Sharon Rabin-
Margalioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 807 (2010). For a more
specific discussion of the market defense as it relates to the Act’s fourth exception
and the Act’s failure to end gender wage discrimination, see Nicole Buonocore
Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimina-
tion Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159 (2011).
45. See Washington Cty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). Female jail guards sued
the County of Washington for being paid “substantially lower wages” in the fe-
male section of the jail than the male guards were paid in the male section of the
jail. Id. at 163–64. They argued they were paid unequal wages for substantially
equal work and, because of intentional sex discrimination, the county had set the
pay scale for female guards lower than the pay scale for male guards. Id. at
163–66.
2020] IS PRIOR SALARY A FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX? 1005
“[t]he starting point for any discussion of sex-based wage discrimina-
tion claims must be the Equal Pay Act of 1963 . . .” and, mirroring
Corning, looked to the purpose and legislative history of the Act to
interpret it.46 Through this analysis, the Court accorded some clarity
to the definition of equal work, holding the term means men’s and wo-
men’s jobs are so identical that they are “unarguably of equal
worth.”47
Although the main issue in Gunther was whether claims of sex-
based wage discrimination were limited to the Equal Pay Act or
whether Title VII could also be used to attack wage discrimination,
the case presented the Court with an opportunity to examine the Act’s
fourth exception. It explained that a pay differential must be based on
a bona fide factor other than sex.48 In other words, employers may
exercise judgment in using a bona fide job rating system to differenti-
ate pay among jobs and employees.49 However, the Court did not spec-
ify what job rating practices constitute bona fide systems, nor did it
give examples or guidance of discrimination and non-bona fide job rat-
ing systems. Therefore, although Corning and Gunther provide valua-
ble insight into what the Supreme Court has found meaningful when
interpreting the Act, there remains uncertainty and room for varying
interpretations of the broad “factor other than sex” exception in lower
courts.50
III. RIZO V. YOVINO
In Rizo, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sought to clarify
whether an employee’s prior salary can be a factor other than sex
under the Act’s ambiguous fourth exception. Few scholars have ad-
dressed the merits and implications of this important equal pay deci-
sion. Of note is the case’s procedural posture; the court heard the case
en banc and reversed its own panel decision, thus overruling a 1982
Ninth Circuit decision directly on point.51 In 2018, the defendant filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. On February
46. Id. at 184.
47. Id. at 188.
48. Id. at 170. Before Gunther, the Supreme Court had not used this term that some
appellate courts had contemplated. The Court explained the Act permits employ-
ers to defend against charges of sex-based discrimination “where their pay differ-
entials are based on a bona fide use of ‘other factors other than sex.’” Id.
(emphasis added).
49. It is not within courts’ or administrative agencies’ powers to “substitute their
judgment for the judgment of the employer” if the employer’s job rating system—
a bona fide job rating system that is not based in discriminatory intent or prac-
tice—does not discriminate on the basis of sex. Id. at 171.
50. See Hamburg, supra note 30, at 1089.
51. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Rizo overruled Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
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25, 2019, the Court granted the petition and vacated the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s judgment on procedural grounds.52 Notwithstanding, the sub-
stantive issue exists all the same and Rizo is still a key case in this
area, adding major ideas to the discussion of prior salary as a factor
other than sex, deepening a circuit split, and furthering the need for
clarity regarding the Act’s catchall exception.
A. Background
Plaintiff Aileen Rizo worked as a math consultant for the Fresno
County Office of Education (the County) in California beginning in Oc-
tober 2009. Before the County hired her, Rizo worked as a middle and
high school math teacher in Arizona.53 The County determined Rizo’s
starting salary using a standard operating procedure that detailed ten
salary levels with ten steps in each level.54 According to its procedure,
the County placed Rizo at step one of level one.55 While conversing
with her colleagues in 2012, Rizo learned she was hired at a lower
salary step than her male math consultant counterparts.56 Later that
year, she filed a complaint with the County regarding the pay dispar-
ity. The County responded by explaining all salaries were set in accor-
dance with the procedure.57 In 2014, Rizo sued Jim Yovino, the
County’s Superintendent, alleging a violation of the Act.58 The County
moved for summary judgment, stating as an affirmative defense that
the discrepancy between Rizo’s salary and her male counterparts’ sal-
52. Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (per curiam). The Court vacated the case
because Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit, who wrote the majority opinion in
Rizo, died before the opinion was issued. Thus, the Court held that the Ninth
Circuit erred in counting the judge’s vote in the en banc majority. See id. at 710;
infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
53. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds, 139 S.
Ct. 706 (2019). At her previous job, Rizo earned $50,630 each year for 206 work-
ing days with a stipend of $1,200 per year as compensation for her two master’s
degrees.
54. Id. at 457–58. The procedure instructed the County to determine a new hire’s
salary by adding five percent to the individual’s prior salary, then placing the
individual in the corresponding salary step. This was a formulaic procedure that
did not factor experience to determine initial salary.
55. Id. This corresponded to a salary of $62,133 for 196 working days with an addi-
tional stipend of $600 for her master’s degrees.
56. Id. at 458.
57. Id. The County stated the procedure had placed more women at higher compen-
sation steps than men over the past twenty-five years (which included time
before the County adopted this specific procedure). Rizo disputed this assertion,
claiming the data showed men were actually placed at a higher average salary
step. Regardless, it was undisputed that Rizo was placed at a lower salary step
than her male math consultant counterparts.
58. Rizo also alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, as well as sex dis-
crimination and failure to prevent discrimination under two California Govern-
ment Code provisions. This Note, like the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, focuses solely
on the alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act.
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aries was based upon her prior salary in Arizona. The County pointed
to the Act’s “factor other than sex” exception as its basis for this
defense.59
The district court denied the County’s motion for summary judg-
ment, holding a pay structure based exclusively on prior wages con-
flicts with the Act because it may “perpetuate a discriminatory wage
disparity between men and women.”60 The County appealed to a panel
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, maintaining prior salary was a
permissible factor other than sex to justify the pay disparity. The
court followed Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co.,61 which determined prior
salary constitutes a factor other than sex under the Act, and held it
was permissible for the County to consider only Rizo’s prior salary as a
factor to set her current salary.62 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted a petition for rehearing en banc to clarify the law, including
the validity of Kouba, and review the district court’s denial of the
County’s motion for summary judgment.63
B. Majority Opinion
The court’s en banc majority opinion began with a discussion of the
Act’s purpose.64 The court set the tone for its purpose-based opinion
by establishing that “Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act in 1963 to
put an end to the ‘serious and endemic problem of employment dis-
crimination in private industry’ and carry out a broad mandate of
equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.”65 Beginning with an anal-
ysis of the Act’s legislative history, the majority first held the Act
should be applied to end historical wage discrimination against wo-
men.66 When Congress passed the Act in 1963, the use of an em-
ployee’s prior pay to set current pay would have reflected a
“discriminatory marketplace that valued the equal work of one sex
59. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 458.
60. Id.
61. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled by Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir.
2018), vacated on other grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019).
62. Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017). The panel directed the dis-
trict court to consider the reasonableness of the County’s reliance on prior salary
on remand, as the consideration of prior salary could only be permissible if it was
reasonable and effectuated some business policy for the County. The Rizo major-
ity opinion summarized this notion as a bona fide factor other than sex.
63. Rizo v. Yovino, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017) (vacating the prior decision and
granting rehearing en banc).
64. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 456.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 460. The court explained the Act “should be construed and applied so as to
fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to achieve.” Id. Based on
its intent and purpose, the court reasoned an employer cannot justify setting an
employee’s starting salary based on her prior pay as a factor other than sex. Id. at
467–68.
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over the other.”67 Therefore, the majority explained, “Congress simply
could not have intended to allow employers to rely on these discrimi-
natory wages as a justification for continuing to perpetuate wage
differentials.”68
After concluding that Congress’s intent barred an employer’s use of
prior salary to justify a wage differential, the majority evaluated
whether prior salary is a permissible factor other than sex within the
meaning of the Act. First, the court turned to two canons of statutory
interpretation to determine the meaning of the exception. Noting this
exception is grouped with exceptions based upon seniority, merit, and
productivity, the court explained “[i]t follows that the more general
exception should be limited to legitimate, job-related reasons as
well.”69 Additionally, the court interpreted the Act’s phrasing in the
provision “a differential based on any other factor other than sex”70 to
mean any other, similar factor. Such a factor, the court reasoned,
must be similar to the other legitimate, job-related reasons provided
in the first three exceptions.71
Next, the court supported its reasoning that its interpretation is
limited to legitimate, job-related factors with the Act’s legislative his-
tory. The Ninth Circuit traced the Supreme Court’s analysis in Corn-
ing to interpret the Act’s “similar working conditions” provision.72 The
author of the majority opinion, Judge Reinhardt, marshaled state-
ments from lawmakers and industry representatives to hold the ex-
ception covers only job-related factors.73 Concluding that Congress
67. Id. at 461.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 461–62. The court used the canon noscitur a sociis, meaning “it is known
from its associates” to ascertain the meaning of the catchall phrase grouped with
the first three exceptions.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 462. Here, the majority applied the canon ejusdem generis, which trans-
lates to “of the same kind, class, or nature” and provides that general terms used
at the end of a list are construed to encompass ideas similar to those enumerated
by the preceding, more specific terms.
72. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195–200 (1974). In Corning,
the Supreme Court evaluated records of House and Senate hearings and com-
pared language in proposed bills to the final Act to determine Congressional in-
tent and interpret the provision.
73. See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 462–65. The court discussed testimony at congressional
hearings from industry representatives who worried the introduced Act lacked an
“understanding of industrial reality” and proposed job-related exceptions that
would include job classification programs. Id. at 463. One representative ex-
plained there are “countless reasons for wage variations . . . which are not dis-
criminatory in nature,” and argued for an exception to the Act that would allow
employers to consider differences in shift times, duties, and training, for example,
when determining employees’ pay. Id. (citing Equal Pay Act: Hearings Before the
H. Special Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor on H.R. 3861,
4269, and Related Bills, 88th Cong. 135 (1963) (statement of W. Boyd Owen, Vice
President of Personnel Administration, Owens-Illinois Glass Co.)). The court ob-
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added the fourth exception in response to testifying employers’ con-
cerns that their legitimate, job-related procedures for setting pay
would become illegal under the Act, the court held that employers may
use “legitimate, job-related means of setting pay but may not use sex
directly or indirectly as a basis for establishing employees’ wages.”74
The opinion also pointed to two other circuits that have construed the
Act’s fourth exception as limited to job-related factors,75 reiterating
their arguments and emphasizing the importance of limiting the ex-
ception to job-related factors in light of the Act’s purpose.76
After this analysis, the majority concluded prior salary is not a fac-
tor other than sex within the meaning of the Act’s fourth exception.77
The opinion explained that although prior salary may “bear a rough
relationship to legitimate factors other than sex,” that relationship is
attenuated and prior salary is not a legitimate measure of experience,
ability to perform, training, or other job-related factors.78 Further, it
argued that using prior salary to set an employee’s pay may “perpetu-
ate the wage disparities prohibited under the Act.”79 Worrying prior
pay could mask continuing unequal pay, the majority required em-
served that most of the exceptions the representatives sought were job-related.
Id. Additionally, the court noted the Act’s first three job-related exceptions are
examples and the fourth is a broad principle created to cover additional, similarly
job-related factors. Id. at 464. Specifically, the court cited a House Committee
Report explaining “a bona fide job classification program that does not discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex will serve as a valid defense to a charge of discrimina-
tion.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3 (1963). A similar Senate Committee Report led
the court to conclude that the factor other than sex exception only covered factors
insofar as they were job related. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 464–65.
74. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 465. The court noted the employer has the burden of proving it
uses a bona fide job classification system or relies on bona fide job-related factors
to set pay. Id.
75. Id. at 465–66. The court interpreted the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Glenn v.
General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988) that “the ‘factor other
than sex’ exception applies when the disparity results from unique characteris-
tics of the same job; from an individual’s experience, training, or ability . . . ” to
mean job-related reasons. Id. Additionally, the court cited the Second Circuit’s
interchangeable use of the terms “job-relatedness requirement” and “legitimate
business-related considerations” to describe an employer’s legal standard for us-
ing the Act’s fourth exception as an affirmative defense. Id. (citing Aldrich v.
Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992)). Although Rizo acknowl-
edged many of the reasons underlying use of the phrases “business-related,” “le-
gitimate business reason,” and “job-related” are similar, the court argued “job-
related” was superior, as the other phrases could “permit the use of far too many
improper justifications for avoiding the strictures of the Act.” Id. at 466. For ex-
ample, the court explained that the market argument asserted in Corning that
provides women will be willing to accept lower salaries than men may qualify as
a business reason but is unacceptable as a “job-related” factor. Id.
76. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 465–67.
77. Id. at 467.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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ployers to prove that job-related factors underlie the employee’s prior
salary in order to justify a wage differential.80 In holding prior salary
is not a factor other than sex, the court overruled its previous decision
in Kouba that the Act “does not impose a strict prohibition against the
use of prior salary.”81 Once again emphasizing the Act’s purpose, the
majority reiterated that an employer’s use of prior salary perpetuates
past gender discrimination that the Act was designed to eliminate
and, therefore, cannot be used as a factor other than sex in initial
wage setting.82
Finally, the majority presented statistical evidence of the gender
wage gap to connect the holding to the Act’s purpose.83 The court con-
cluded, consistent with its purpose-focused analysis, that “[a]llowing
prior salary to justify a wage differential perpetuates [the message
that women are not worth as much as men], entrenching in salary
systems an obvious means of discrimination—the very discrimination
that the Act was designed to prohibit and rectify.”84 The majority
maintained that prior salary, regardless of other factors, is not job-
related and perpetuates wage disparities caused by sex.85 Therefore,
because the County relied upon Rizo’s prior salary to set her pay, it
failed to establish prior salary as a factor other than sex for purposes
of the defense.86
C. Concurring Opinions
Three judges filed concurring opinions with the decision, drawing
attention to the contrast between Rizo’s straightforward case and the
complexity of the underlying law and its multiple possibilities for in-
80. Id. In other words, the majority ruled that prior salary is not a factor other than
sex. However, if an employer can prove that legitimate, job-related factors were
used to set an employee’s prior salary, it may instead use those factors as an
affirmative defense under the Act’s fourth exception.
81. Id. In Kouba, the court held that a pay differential based upon prior salary was
permissible if the employer could show that using prior salary to set pay (1) effec-
tuated some business policy and (2) was reasonable in light of the employer’s
practices and purposes for using prior pay. Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d
873, 878 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled by Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).
82. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 467.
83. Id. The majority considered excerpts from an amicus brief that included informa-
tion that women earn lower wages than men across industries, occupations, and
education levels. Brief of Equal Rights Advocates and 21 Other Organizations in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellee’s Supplemental Brief During Pendency of Rehear-
ing as Amici Curiae, Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-15372).
84. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 468.
85. Id. at 460, 468.
86. Id. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the County’s motion for sum-
mary judgment and remanded the case to be considered under the new law set
forth in the majority opinion.
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terpretation.87 Although every judge agreed that the majority cor-
rectly decided Rizo’s case as a violation of the Act, the extent to which
the judges supported the majority’s rationale differed significantly.88
The first concurrence, written by Judge McKeown,89 re-empha-
sized the majority’s observation that prior salary can reflect historical
sex discrimination and that the Act “prohibits this kind of ‘piling on’
where women can never overcome the historical inequality.”90 How-
ever, Judge McKeown wrote separately to assert the majority went too
far in holding that any consideration of prior pay—even consideration
of prior salary with other job-related factors—is impermissible under
the Act.91 The concurring opinion explained that the majority came to
a “puzzling outcome” by distinguishing legitimate, job-related factors
and then rendering those factors futile when an employer also consid-
ers prior salary.92 Instead, Judge McKeown wrote that prior salary
may be considered when setting a new salary, not as a standalone de-
fense, but with other factors.93 Additionally, she clarified that employ-
87. Id. at 453. Of the eleven judges who heard the case, five joined Judge Reinhardt’s
majority opinion and two joined concurring opinions. The judges agreed that
Rizo’s case presented a clear violation of the Act because prior salary was the only
difference between Rizo’s pay and her male counterparts’ pay. Id. at 469 (McKe-
own, J., concurring) (explaining Rizo’s situation as “a textbook violation of the
‘equal pay for equal work’ mantra” and stating “Rizo’s case is an easy one.”). How-
ever, the judges’ opinions differed with respect to the permissibility of prior pay
as a defense, either alone or considered with other factors. Id. at 470–71; Id. at
472–73 (Callahan, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 468–79; see also Employment Litigation, 30 No. 8 BUS. TORTS REP. 183, 185
(2018) (summarizing the differences between each concurring opinion).
89. See infra section IV.B for an in-depth analysis of Judge McKeown’s concurring
opinion.
90. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 469 (McKeown, J., concurring). Judge McKeown wrote the con-
curring opinion in which Judge Murguia joined.
91. Id. at 469–70. Judge McKeown clarified, “prior salary alone is not a defense to
unequal pay for equal work . . . [h]owever, employers do not necessarily violate
the Equal Pay Act when they consider prior salary among other factors when
setting initial wages.” Id. at 469.
For simplicity, this Note presents this issue in terms of whether an employer
may “consider” prior salary under a particular approach. However, the rule is
more nuanced than this characterization suggests. Specifically, the rule is that
when an employer uses prior salary and that use results in a pay disparity be-
tween men and women doing the same work, the employer increases its risk of
violating the Act because, depending on the circumstances, the employer may not
have a defense under the “factor other than sex” exception.
92. Id. at 472.
93. Id. at 470. Judge McKeown cautioned that the majority’s holding that prior sal-
ary may never be considered as a benchmark for an employee’s starting salary
may disadvantage women in practice. This is because employers often consider
salary to lure talent from competitors and voluntary discussions of prior salary
can help women negotiate higher pay. Id. at 471–72. She added, “it may well be
that salary accurately gauges a prospective employee’s ‘skill, effort, and responsi-
bility,’ as the Equal Pay Act envisions . . . and a new employer wants to exceed
that benchmark.” Id. at 471. Thus, chilling all discussions of prior pay may keep
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ers still have the burden of showing that a “pay differential is based on
a valid job-related factor other than sex.”94
Similarly, Judge Callahan argued that although Rizo’s case was
properly decided, the majority’s rationale “unnecessarily ignores the
realities of business and, in doing so, may hinder rather than promote
equal pay for equal work.”95 The concurrence noted that the Supreme
Court had never specifically limited the Act’s fourth exception to job-
related factors. Therefore, he concluded the exception should be read
broadly.96 Like Judge McKeown, Judge Callahan reasoned that prior
pay cannot be an employer’s only justification for a pay differential
under the Act’s fourth exception.97 He focused on business implica-
tions of the decision and explained that employers find prior salary
important to their abilities to exercise flexibility and recruit competi-
tive employees.98 Unlike the majority and first concurring opinion,
however, he questioned whether prior pay is a reflection of gender dis-
crimination and, directly contradicting the majority opinion, held
prior salary “is not inherently a reflection of gender discrimination.”99
Finally, Judge Watford concurred with the majority’s judgment but
argued prior pay can be a factor other than sex only if the employee’s
prior salary does not reflect sex discrimination.100 His concurrence
tracked the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Corning, acknowledging the
purpose of the Act but leaving uncertainty as to what an employer
must show to prove prior salary does not reflect sex discrimination.101
Even more than the preceding concurrences, this opinion demon-
women from attaining higher salaries when they begin new positions. See discus-
sion infra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
94. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 469 (McKeown, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 473 (Callahan, J., concurring). Judge Callahan wrote the concurring opin-
ion in which Judge Tallman joined.
96. Id. at 474.
97. Id. at 475.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 477. Judge Callahan noted that differences in pay may be based on other
factors, including, for example, cost of living if the employee is coming from a
different part of the country. He also expressed trust that private employers have
already adjusted their pay systems to be gender neutral. Id.
100. Id. at 478–79 (Watford, J., concurring).
101. Judge Watford acknowledged that it would be extremely difficult for an employer
who pays female employees less than male employees by relying on prior salary
to prove “that its female employees’ past pay is not tainted by sex discrimination,
including discriminatory pay differentials attributable to prevailing market
forces.” Id. Cf. Gordon v. United States, 903 F.3d 1248, 1254–57 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(Reyna, J., concurring) (discussing the difficulty in overcoming the burden of
proof of historical discrimination against women as a plaintiff and citing Rizo
when recommending the Federal Circuit fall in line with other circuit courts that
assume pay differentials between men and women are based on sex), vacated, 754
F. App’x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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strates the judges’ variety in reasoning and the uncertainty underly-
ing the interpretation of the Act’s ambiguous fourth exception.
D. Certiorari and Supreme Court Opinion
On February 25, 2019, the Supreme Court issued an opinion per
curiam on the County’s petition for certiorari.102 However, the Court
refused to discuss substantive issues in the case, dodging the issue of
whether prior salary is a factor other than sex and whether the Ninth
Circuit correctly decided the case. Instead, the Court focused on Judge
Reinhardt, who penned the Rizo majority opinion and died eleven
days before it was issued.103 Had the judge’s vote not been counted,
the majority opinion would have been approved by only five of the ten
still-living panelists.104 Thus, although Judge Reinhardt fully partici-
pated in the case while alive, the Court determined it was unlawful to
count his vote because one cannot exercise judicial power after
death.105 The Court declared that “federal judges are appointed for
life, not for eternity.”106
By deciding the case solely on these unique procedural grounds
and ignoring the substantive issue of prior salary altogether, the
Court missed a momentous opportunity to clarify the law. Rizo was
the perfect case for the Court to consider, as the County determined
Ms. Rizo’s pay solely based upon prior salary. There were no other
factors to complicate a substantive analysis, yet the Court declined to
consider this narrow issue. By once again dodging the issue of equal
pay, the Court has perpetuated the ongoing debate about the role of
prior salary. Perhaps merely granting the petition for certiorari was a
warning shot that the Court is gearing up to consider an equal pay
case. However, refusing to acknowledge the substantive issue appears
to indicate that the Court is not yet ready. Regardless, the issue re-
mains and Rizo illustrates the ongoing debate that employees and em-
ployers are struggling to reconcile without clear guidance.
E. Circuit Split
The Ninth Circuit’s landmark decision in Rizo deepened an ex-
isting split among the federal circuit courts of appeals. Circuits had
already adopted varied interpretations of the “factor other than sex”
exception, including a rule that the justification must be job-related or
a legitimate business reason.107 Additionally, Rizo created a direct
102. Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (per curiam).
103. Id. at 707–08.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 707.
106. Id. at 710.
107. See Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing, and the Glass Ceiling: Why the Gender
Difference in Salary Negotiation Is Not a “Factor Other Than Sex” Under the
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split with the Seventh Circuit as to whether employers may consider
prior salary and use it as an affirmative defense. Circuits disagree as
to whether prior pay may justify a wage disparity under the Act, ei-
ther alone or in conjunction with other factors.108
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Rizo, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
have held that, although prior pay cannot justify a wage differential
alone, it may be considered with other factors to establish the factor
other than sex affirmative defense.109 These courts have explained
that although the Act “precludes an employer from relying solely upon
a prior salary to justify pay disparity,”110 it is prudent and permissible
for employers to consider prior salary with other factors other than
sex.111 These circuits allow employers to assert prior salary as a de-
fense when they can point to additional factors that meet the court’s
threshold for the Act’s fourth exception.112 The Second and Eighth
Circuits have applied a more lenient version of this approach, allowing
prior salary as a factor other than sex when an employer also takes
some other precaution.113
On the other hand, Rizo directly contradicts the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs.,114 which held prior
salary is always a factor other than sex.115 In Wernsing, the plaintiff
Equal Pay Act, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 25–30 (2009); Bowden, supra note 19,
at 234–44. Courts and legal scholars have differed as to whether a factor other
than sex differential requires employers to prove a bona fide factor, business rela-
tion, acceptable business reason, or legitimate business reason, among other clas-
sifications. Id. Rizo added to this more general discussion of the Act’s exception,
arguing the standard for any factor other than sex should be a job-related factor
other than sex. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
108. See Laura Palk & Shelly Grunsted, Born Free: Toward an Expansive Definition of
Sex, 25 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 16 (2018) (noting generally a split on the issue of
“whether pay history alone can support a wage disparity claim.”).
109. See Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015); Irby v. Bittick, 44
F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995); Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567,
1570–71 (11th Cir. 1988).
110. Riser, 776 F.3d at 1199 (quoting Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 2003 WL
21529409, at *508 (10th Cir. July 8, 2003)).
111. Id.; see also Irby, 44 F.3d at 955 (“This court has not held that prior salary can
never be used by an employer to establish pay, just that such a justification can-
not solely carry the affirmative defense.”).
112. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525–26 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding prior salary is a permissible defense when the employer meets a
“bona fide business-related reason” standard).
113. Id. at 526 (concluding that requiring a factor other than sex to be job-related
serves as a limitation on an employer’s ability to justify a wage differential);
Drum v. Leeson Elec. Corp., 565 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009) (allowing the use
of prior salary as a defense for a wage differential but cautioned the court “care-
fully examines the record to ensure that an employer does not rely on the prohib-
ited ‘market force theory’ to justify lower wages for female employees . . . .”).
114. 427 F.3d 466, 468–70 (7th Cir. 2005).
115. Id.
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alleged that her employer discriminated against women through its
standard compensation program, which provided employees with a
ten percent raise from their prior salary.116 She argued (1) her em-
ployer lacked an acceptable business reason for considering prior pay
when setting her salary and (2) the use of prior pay to set salary was
discriminatory because pay systems historically discriminate on ac-
count of sex.117
The court rejected the plaintiff’s first argument, holding courts do
not set standards for the exception and classifying a factor as an ac-
ceptable business reason is not required.118 It then acknowledged the
premise of the plaintiff’s second argument that an employer’s reliance
on prior salary cannot support the exception because market wages
are discriminatory, but held her conclusion did not logically follow.119
The court explained that although women’s wages are less than men’s
on average, pay changes with experience and “other aspects of human
capital.”120 The court held prior salary is a permissible justification
for a wage differential unless the plaintiff can prove that using prior
wages as base pay was discriminatory because sex discrimination led
to lower wages in the prior jobs.121 In that situation, the court rea-
soned, there would be adequate evidence to show prior salary perpetu-
ated sex discrimination and violated the Act.122
Although the court acknowledged that wages could be discrimina-
tory, it placed greater value on the plaintiff’s ability to prove her prior
salary was discriminatory on the basis of sex.123 Ms. Wernsing did not
meet this burden because she presented no specific evidence that her
116. Id. at 467. Wernsing alleged her coworkers were given higher salaries due to
discriminatory prior pay. Specifically, she pointed to a male coworker hired at the
same time she was who had been earning $3,399 monthly at his past job and
received a ten percent raise when he joined the Department. Wernsing, on the
other hand, had been earning $1,925 monthly and started at the Department
with an almost thirty percent raise, but still earned less than her male coworker
at $2,478 per month. Moreover, Wernsing provided evidence that the Depart-
ment’s pay scale has a maximum for annual raises, which her male coworker will
“top out” years before she does. Id.
117. Id. at 468.
118. Id. at 468–70. Writing for the majority, Judge Easterbrook explained that an em-
ployer can act for any reason and specified “[t]he [Equal Pay Act] asks whether
the employer has a reason other than sex—not whether it has a ‘good’ reason.” Id.
at 468.
119. The court described Wernsing’s conclusion that all considerations of prior salary
are discriminatory as a “non-sequitur.” Id at 470.
120. Id. In explaining how wages may differ between the genders, Judge Easterbrook
gave only one (arguably unconvincing) example: “many women spend more years
in child-rearing than do men [which] implies that women’s market wages will be
lower on average, but such a difference does not show discrimination . . . .” Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 470–71.
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pay was based on discriminatory principles.124 However, the court did
not specify what evidence is sufficient for proving discrimination in
prior pay, and this would likely be an extremely high burden for a
plaintiff to reach. The Rizo majority directly split with the Wernsing
rationale when it held that prior salary perpetuates wage discrimina-
tion and, therefore, may never be considered in setting an employee’s
starting salary.
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in Rizo captures Congress’s intent in enact-
ing the Equal Pay Act and the importance of its history as applied to
the gender wage gap issues that persist today. The Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly held, based upon the purpose of the Act, that Rizo’s employer
could not justify setting her salary by using her prior pay within the
Act’s “factor other than sex” affirmative defense.125 Although this de-
cision would have significantly clarified the law within the Ninth Cir-
cuit by declaring that employers simply may not rely upon prior
salary, it deepened the circuit split on the issue and raised questions
about whether employers should ever be able to consider prior salary
when setting employees’ new salaries.126
This analysis first discusses the challenges employers face in light
of Rizo and ongoing uncertainty.127 Next, it proposes a middle-ground
approach to resolve the prior salary debate. It argues Judge McKe-
own’s concurrence in Rizo and the majority opinions in the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits assert the best approach by holding that employers
may consider prior salary only in conjunction with other job-related
factors other than sex.128 The proposed approach uniquely advocates
for equal pay and remedies gender pay inequity without disregarding
employers’ interests.129
124. Id.
125. See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 468 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds,
139 S. Ct. 706 (2019).
126. See, e.g., Hamburg, supra note 30, at 1089 (explaining “the judicial debate con-
cerning the circumstances under which prior salary qualifies as a sex-neutral fac-
tor illustrates lower courts’ conflicting positions on the scope of the factor other
than sex defense.”); Employers Violate Equal Pay Act When They Consider New
Employees’ Prior Salaries in Establishing Salary Structures, Concurrences Argue
That Prior Salaries May Be Considered as One of Several Factors Rizo v. Yovino,
887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. April 9, 2018), 39 NO. 5 CAL. TORT REP. 135 (2018) (ex-
plaining the differences between the Rizo majority and concurring opinions to the
extent the judges disagreed about when employers may consider prior salary, if
ever).
127. See infra section IV.A.
128. See infra section IV.B.
129. Few scholars have looked beyond the procedural posture of Rizo after its time
before the Supreme Court and addressed the majority or concurring opinions and
their impact on equal pay. Within the greater discussion of prior salary as a fac-
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A. Employers Face Uncertainty in Light of Rizo
The Rizo majority’s holding that an employer may not justify a
wage differential when men and women perform substantially the
same work by relying upon prior salary drew attention from employ-
ers nationwide. This holding starkly contrasts with other circuit
courts taking more moderate approaches.130 Thus, it has concerned
employers who do not understand what a prior salary ban means for
their day-to-day business practices.131 Although Rizo correctly ob-
served that prior salary can and often does reflect historical sex dis-
crimination, its categorical rule fails to account for economic realities
and leaves employers—and even many employees—to face uncer-
tainty and practical challenges.132
In light of Rizo and several states and municipalities passing in-
consistent legislation to ban prior salary inquiries, employers have
grown increasingly concerned about compliance with the Act.133 Best
practices suggest that employers remove all inquiries about prior sal-
ary from employment applications and general recruitment docu-
ments to avoid liability.134 Because judicial interpretation of the Act
varies and local laws banning consideration of prior salary have been
enacted in different jurisdictions, some employers operating through-
out the country have eliminated questions about pay history alto-
gether to avoid a “legal minefield.”135 Still, questions remain as to
whether an employee may voluntarily start a discussion regarding
tor other than sex, even fewer commentators have taken an employer-friendly
perspective that sets forth an alternative to a complete ban on prior salary infor-
mation. This Note, on the other hand, suggests that promulgating the Act’s pur-
pose to end discrimination and giving employers greater flexibility need not be
mutually exclusive. It does so by recommending a middle-ground approach that
promotes effective business practices for employers who act in good faith but lim-
its employers from simply perpetuating the wage gap. This approach encourages
employers to examine potential employees’ value, curbs the damage that employ-
ers who try to circumvent a ban may cause, and gives female employees greater
latitude to negotiate for higher pay than a categorical anti-employer rule can
provide.
130. See supra section III.E.
131. Perhaps even more confused are employers in circuits that have not addressed
whether prior salary is a factor other than sex but fear liability all the same.
132. See supra notes 18–28 and accompanying text.
133. See Sheryl J. Willert, A Little Advance Notice on Employment Issues That Will Be
Faced by General Counsel in 2018, 2018 IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., 46, 49 (inquiring
“Why should [a ban on prior salary inquiries] keep corporate counsel and man-
agement up at night?”).
134. See Robert Nichols & Lauren West, End of an Era? Growing List of Laws Is End-
ing the Use of Comp History in Hiring, 30 WESTLAW J. EMP. 1, 3 (2018).
135. See Yuki Noguchi, More Employers Avoid Legal Minefield By Not Asking About
Pay History, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (May 3, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://www.
npr.org/2018/05/03/608126494/more-employers-avoid-legal-minefield-by-not-ask-
ing-about-pay-history [https://perma.unl.edu/3LB4-DD4U] (“Some companies
aren’t waiting for the legal questions to settle: Amazon, Wells Fargo, American
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prior salary; what happens with first-time job applicants who do not
have a salary history; whether a ban extends to salary negotiations;
and whether employers can consider prior salary for lateral hires, pro-
motions, or job transfers within the same organization. The Rizo ma-
jority does not adequately address these uncertainties and admittedly
leaves further questions “for decision in subsequent cases” unlike the
clearer middle-ground approach Judge McKeown articulated.136
To the extent prior salary information is helpful, eliminating all
means of inquiring about a potential employee’s prior pay can be diffi-
cult for employers. For many employers, asking candidates about sal-
ary history has been a long-standing interview process.137 This
information provides recruiters with a benchmark for the potential
employee’s expectations and can be particularly useful where the em-
ployer seeks to lure talented employees from competitors by offering
higher pay.138 Of course, although salary history is helpful, employers
can get by without asking or can limit their consideration of prior sal-
ary through the use of other job-related factors. The purpose of the
Act, as the Rizo majority explained, supersedes the convenience of re-
lying solely upon salary history to set an employee’s pay. However, the
burdens of compliance in this state of uncertainty become a concern
for employers if prior salary may never be considered.
Employers who seek to maintain compliance with the Act and up-
hold its underlying purpose to end wage discrimination face practical
challenges.139 Complying with changing requirements may necessi-
tate an overhaul of hiring documents, training for hiring profession-
als, and ongoing internal audits.140 Business leaders who are
concerned with compliance must move resources from profit centers to
make changes in hopes of preventing litigation on uncertain grounds
and defending their hiring practices.141 These tasks are exacerbated
for employers operating in states with different laws. Compliance is
achievable, but unnecessarily frustrated by the current uncertainty of
Express, Cisco, Google and Bank of America all recently changed hiring policies
to eliminate questions about pay history.”).
136. See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 461, 472 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other
grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (McKeown, J., concurring).
137. See Charles H. Kaplan & Theresa M. Levine, Salary Inquiries Are History in
NYC: Employers Banned from Asking About Applicants’ Pay, 24 NO. 5 N.Y. EMP.
L. LETTER 3 (2017).
138. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
139. See Kaplan & Levine, supra note 137, at 3.
140. See Willert, supra note 133, at 49 (explaining that changing business practices to
comply with different regulatory requirements “may well be difficult for local
management who are accustomed to making decisions in a different way—includ-
ing making inquiries about compensation in an effort to hire the best talent,
while at the same time saving significant money for the company.”).
141. Id. (“[M]any general counsel have seen firsthand the nightmare that can occur
because there are different regulatory requirements in different locations.”).
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the law. Both employers and employees need a clear rule that recon-
ciles the purpose of the Act with the practicalities of conducting busi-
ness, as Judge McKeown, the Tenth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit
properly observe.142
B. Courts Should Adopt the Middle-Ground Approach
A middle-ground approach is best suited to end gender wage dis-
crimination while addressing uncertainty and acknowledging employ-
ers’ practical demands.143 Like the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
Judge McKeown opined that prior salary may not be considered as a
standalone defense, but is permissible when considered with other job-
related factors.144 This concurring opinion struck a practical balance
between policy and application that the majority opinion lacked. It
agreed with and reemphasized the majority’s policy considerations
and fervor for the purpose of the Act—arguably, the strongest part of
the opinion—adding information about the persistence of the wage
gap today.145
This middle-ground approach rejects the majority’s view that prior
salary may never be used to set employees’ salaries. Judge McKeown
concluded that it is lawful and consistent with the purpose of the Act
to “forbid employers from baldly asserting prior salary as a defense—
without determining whether it accurately measures experience, edu-
cation, training or other lawful factors—and to permit consideration of
prior salary along with those valid factors.”146 She properly observed
that the majority made a categorical error, similar in kind but oppo-
site in character to the Seventh Circuit’s outlier holding in Wernsing,
in announcing prior salary is never a factor other than sex.147 The
142. See infra section IV.B; see also Tony Puckett, Should You Ask Job Applicants
How Much They Made at Their Last Job?, 25 NO. 6. OKLA. EMP. L. LETTER 2
(2017) (explaining that employers within the Tenth Circuit may not rely solely
upon prior salary to justify a pay differential and suggesting a compensation plan
based on other factors).
143. See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 461, 472 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other
grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (McKeown, J., concurring).
144. Id.
145. This discussion was similar to that of the majority opinion, citing legislative his-
tory and President John F. Kennedy’s remarks at the Act’s signing ceremony to
glean its purpose, which the concurrence summarized as “eras[ing] the gender
wage gap.” Id. Additionally, Judge McKeown noted the median salary for a fe-
male employee was only eighty percent of the salary for a male employee as of
2017. Id. at 468–70.
146. Id. at n.1. Judge McKeown also cited a congressional report that explained “there
are many factors which may be used to measure the relationships between jobs
and which establish a valid basis for a difference in pay” and, to this extent, only
explained, “wage differentials based solely on the sex of the employee are an un-
fair labor standard.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 2 (1963) (emphasis added).
147. See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 471 (McKeown, J., concurring). Judge McKeown explained
that the Seventh Circuit’s decision that prior salary is always a factor other than
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holding in Rizo forbidding employers from considering prior salary at
all is drastic because organizations often use prior salary to recruit
employees with specific skills. Salary may be an accurate representa-
tion of an employee’s talent and what the organization needs to of-
fer.148 The majority stressed the importance of considering those very
skills when stating that factors must be job-related, but irrationally
rendered them useless if prior salary was also involved.149 New em-
ployers are willing to exceed a talented employee’s prior salary and a
bar on any consideration of prior salary stifles this good policy. Moreo-
ver, the majority’s rule burdens employers acting in good faith with a
risk of liability under the Act. The majority failed to fully consider its
impact on businesses and employee mobility between employers upon
which the first two concurring opinions turn.
The middle-ground approach that Judge McKeown presented bal-
ances employees’ and employers’ salary negotiation needs. It aptly ob-
serves that a ban on all consideration of prior salary in fact
disadvantages women by chilling voluntary salary discussions.150
Under the ban, women seeking new employment may not be able to
negotiate themselves to higher salaries than a simple benchmark
would provide.151 For example, a recent study showed that women
sex and does not need to be related to job requirements violates the Act’s purpose.
She explained, “inherent in the Act is an understanding that compensation
should mirror one’s ‘skill, effort, and responsibility.’” Id. (quoting Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)). Because it is well-established that
historical sex discrimination persists today, she reasoned, “it cannot be that prior
salary always reflects a factor other than sex.” Id.
148. Id. Judge McKeown added the Act “should not be an impediment for employees
seeking a brighter future and a higher salary at a new job” and pointed to studies
showing that employers are willing to pay high salaries to lure talented employ-
ees away from competitors, particularly in engineering and technology positions.
Id. at 471–72. Judge Callahan echoed this value for practicality in business, stat-
ing the majority’s rule ignores the economic incentives of enticing potential em-
ployees to a new job. Id. at 473 (Callahan, J., concurring). He explained, “In the
private sector, basing initial salary upon previous salary, plus other factors such
as experience and education, encourages hard work and rewards applicants who
have stellar credentials. The majority opinion stifles these economic incentives
with a flat prohibition on ever considering prior salary . . . .” Id.
149. Id. at 472 (McKeown, J., concurring) (“[T]he majority nonetheless renders those
valid, job-related factors nugatory when an employer also considers prior salary.
That is a puzzling outcome.”).
150. Id. (“[I]n the real world, an employer ‘rel[ies] on prior salary to set initial wages’
when it takes the prior salary offered voluntarily by an employee in negotiations
and sets a starting salary above those past wages, even if there is an established
pay scale.”).
151. See Employment Law—Equal Pay Legislation—Oregon Bans Employers from
Asking Job Applicants About Prior Salary.—Oregon Equal Pay Act of 2017, 2017
Or. Laws Ch. 197, H.B. 2005 (To Be Codified in Scattered Sections of Or. Rev.
Stat.), 131 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1519–20 (2018). The article compared salary his-
tory bans to “ban the box” laws that prohibit employers from asking job appli-
cants about criminal history. Although there are differences between ban the box
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who refused to disclose their prior salaries received lower wage offers
than women who did disclose, suggesting that leaving the employer to
make a wage determination without prior pay information and prohib-
iting a female applicant from voluntarily disclosing her pay may dis-
advantage her.152 Not only does this result frustrate the purpose of
the Act and hinder many women from achieving higher pay, but it is
also impractical for employers trying to recruit talented employees
and offer reasonably competitive pay.
The middle-ground approach also limits employers’ abilities to cir-
cumvent a simple ban on all prior salary inquiries. Due to the busi-
ness difficulties in eliminating prior salary inquiries altogether,
employers will find other ways to approximate an employee’s prior sal-
ary.153 For example, recruiters can ask employees about their pay ex-
pectations or perceptions of an acceptable salary rate.154 Although
these questions are not the same as asking for prior salary, they pro-
vide employers with anchoring points that may give insight into the
laws and salary history bans, the article notes that ban the box laws that were
enacted to improve employment outcomes for individuals with criminal records in
fact exacerbated racial discrimination based on stereotypes about black criminal-
ity. The article predicts a similar impact for a ban on salary history discussions,
suggesting employers may offer women lower salaries by virtue of not being able
to discuss prior pay.
152. See Lydia Frank, Why Banning Questions About Salary History May Not Improve
Pay Equity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/why-ban-
ning-questions-about-salary-history-may-not-improve-pay-equity [https://
perma.unl.edu/3M6Y-5T6R]. The author hypothesized this result occurs because
employers assume women who refuse to disclose pay earn less. This assumption
may not exist for men who refuse to discuss prior pay. The article argues that a
ban on asking for pay history does not achieve the Act’s purpose of eliminating
the wage gap if employers actually set salaries based on gender assumptions
when candidates do not or cannot share what they have previously earned. Cf.
Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-
Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When
Criminal Histories Are Hidden 17–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 22469, 2016) (explaining a similar phenomenon with ban the box poli-
cies preventing employers from conducting criminal background checks early in
the job application process. This study found that ban the box policies decreased
the probability of employment for young, low-skilled, black men by 5.1% and con-
cluded that these policies have “unintentionally done more harm than good when
it comes to helping disadvantaged job-seekers find jobs.”).
153. Roy Maurer, How to Comply with Bans on Queries About a Candidate’s Salary




154. Id. See also Jennifer Roeslmeier, 3 Alternatives to Asking a Job Applicant About
Their Salary History, AUTOMATED BUS. DESIGNS (Nov. 5, 2019), https://
www.abd.net/3-alternatives-to-asking-a-job-applicant-about-their-salary-history/
[https://perma.unl.edu/G4KZ-TGLP] (suggesting useful alternatives to asking
about salary history in light of a state law ban).
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employee’s previous pay. Unlike the middle-ground approach, an out-
right ban would allow employers to frame questions slightly differ-
ently to ascertain prior salary without being required to look at
additional job-related factors. The middle-ground approach, on the
other hand, (1) does not incentivize employers to find ways around the
rules to consider salary history and (2) provides a safety net of other
job-related factors to legitimize the employee’s salary. Although this
approach may at first seem less stringent than an outright ban, it
takes important realities into account to better guide employers and
protect employees from gender pay inequity.
Additionally, an analysis of the more sensible middle-ground ap-
proach reveals an anomaly in the Rizo majority’s approach to salary
negotiations. Although the court stated it was expressing a general
rule about prior salary and noted salary negotiations as a separate,
unresolved issue,155 the impact of the opinion’s categorical rule sug-
gests otherwise. The court explained it did not wish to pose an obsta-
cle to future panels deciding whether prior salary may be used in
negotiations,156 and there is good reason for this. Like prior pay, there
is merit to the argument that the salary negotiation process is not
truly a gender-neutral factor other than sex because these negotia-
tions have different outcomes for men and women.157 Studies have
shown that men are generally more aggressive in negotiating salaries
than women and that women may be disadvantaged by sex stereo-
types during negotiations.158 Still, for women who want to negotiate
pay and confront these biases head-on, an obstacle to negotiations
that the majority hinted at could frustrate those objectives.
Despite proclaiming that use of prior salary in negotiations is a
separate issue that should be considered independently, the practical
effect of the majority’s categorical rule is to chill salary negotiations.
Even with the majority’s caveat for negotiations, the rule goes too far
and leaves “little daylight for arguing that negotiated starting salaries
155. See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 461.
156. Id.
157. See Sabrina L. Brown, Note, Negotiating Around the Equal Pay Act: Use of the
“Factor Other Than Sex” Defense to Escape Liability, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 471, 492,
497 (2017) (discussing social science research that demonstrates a gender dispar-
ity in salary negotiations and proposing legislation to ban consideration of negoti-
ation as a factor other than sex within the Act’s fourth exception); see also Elzer,
supra note 107, at 3 (arguing “employers’ reliance on salary negotiation should
not be considered a valid factor other than sex.”).
158. See, e.g., Emily T. Amanatullah & Michael W. Morris, Negotiating Gender Roles:
Gender Differences in Assertive Negotiating Are Mediated by Women’s Fear of
Backlash and Attenuated When Negotiating on Behalf of Others, 98 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 256 (2010); Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L.
REV. 581, 632 (2018); Laura J. Kray et al., Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype
Confirmation and Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
942 (2001).
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should be treated differently than established pay scales.”159 Al-
though the majority considered the policy behind its decision, it ap-
pears to have underestimated how far a ban could reach. A general
rule that employers may not consider prior salary perpetuates uncer-
tainty and does not promote the equal-pay-for-equal-work mantra to
its purported extent. Instead, the middle-ground approach promotes a
clear judicial rule that prior salary may be considered with other job-
related factors. Not only does this squash the perpetuation of pay dis-
crimination by requiring employers to consider legitimate factors, but
it also limits the chilling results of the paternalistic ban approach. In
other words, the middle-ground approach works to limit an employer’s
ability to justify a wage disparity based on prior salary without sti-
fling good business practices or taking away women’s power to negoti-
ate themselves to higher pay.160
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted this prudent ap-
proach, holding prior salary alone cannot justify a wage disparity but
can be considered in conjunction with other factors. In Irby v. Bit-
tick,161 the Eleventh Circuit held that male employees’ prior salaries
did not justify a wage disparity, but the employer could justify the
disparity as a factor other than sex with male employees’ past experi-
ence.162 This decision did not bar discussion of prior salary altogether
but, as the middle-ground approach would suggest, merely prohibited
employers from relying solely on prior salary to justify the wage differ-
159. See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 472 (McKeown, J., concurring).
160. Additionally, the procedure of the Act serves as a backstop for ensuring an em-
ployer is not using prior salary to wrongfully justify a wage differential between
employees of different sexes, as the burden still falls on employers to show that a
pay differential is based on a job-related factor other than sex. See Equal Pay Act
of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206. Under Rizo, the employer is required to prove that the
differential is based on an additional job-related factor other than prior salary.
161. 44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1995).
162. Id. at 950. Plaintiff Barbara Irby was hired to work as an investigator in the
Monroe County Sheriff’s Department in Georgia, where she learned two male
investigators were paid substantially more than her. Irby performed work identi-
cal to the work of the two male investigators. She filed suit against the County
Sheriff alleging a violation of the Equal Pay Act. The Sheriff responded that the
use of the male investigators’ prior salaries in setting the current salary was a
legitimate factor other than sex and the pay disparity existed because the male
investigators worked at the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department longer than
Irby and had greater experience. The court explained that the Eleventh Circuit
has “consistently held that ‘prior salary alone cannot justify pay disparity’ under
the [Act],” but noted a defendant “may successfully raise the affirmative defense
of ‘any other factor other than sex’ if he proves that he relied on prior salary and
experience in setting a ‘new’ employee’s salary.” Id. at 955 (quoting Glenn v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988)). Because the male investiga-
tors’ experience with the Department presented a business reason that justified
the use of prior salary, the Department prevailed on its affirmative defense. Id. at
955–56.
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ential. Similarly, in Riser v. QEP Energy,163 the Tenth Circuit held
the Act “precludes an employer from relying solely upon a prior salary
to justify a pay disparity.”164 There, the court rejected the employer’s
defense because it could not meet its burden of proving a factor other
than the female employee’s former salary justified a wage dispar-
ity.165 Together, these cases illustrate how a middle-ground approach
would allow courts to draw lines,166 define rules for employers, protect
employees’ interests in obtaining equal pay, and uphold the purpose of
the Act.
In addition to judicial support for this approach, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—the agency charged with
enforcing the Act—would allow for consideration of prior salary with
other factors.167 The EEOC directly addressed the issue of prior sal-
ary as a factor other than sex and observed it cannot justify a compen-
sation disparity on its own because it can reflect sex-based
discrimination. Consistent with the middle-ground approach, the
EEOC states that an employer’s consideration of prior salary is per-
missible “as part of a mix of factors—as, for example, where the em-
ployer also considers education and experience and concludes that the
employee’s prior salary accurately reflects ability, based on job-related
163. 776 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2015).
164. Id. at 1199.
165. Id. Kathy Riser worked at an energy company, QEP, which developed a fifteen-
grade pay scale based on compensation data. Although she performed substan-
tially equal work to two of her male counterparts, they each earned over thirty
percent more than she did. QEP argued the wage differential was based upon its
gender-neutral pay classification system and the court held the classification sys-
tem would only serve as a defense where a difference in pay resulting from the
system is rooted in “legitimate business-related difference in work responsibili-
ties and qualifications for the particular positions at issue.” Id. at 1198–99. With-
out other business reasons, QEP’s affirmative defense failed.
166. This approach requires additional consideration of where the best place to draw a
line between permissible and impermissible use of prior salary lies. This Note
proposes the middle-ground approach for resolving the ongoing debate about
prior salary as a factor other than sex but acknowledges that there are still nu-
ances for courts to address within the “other factors” allowed. For example, there
is room to clarify precisely whether and when a salary negotiation would be a
permissible other factor. If a potential employee volunteers her prior salary in the
midst of a salary negotiation to demand higher pay and the employer uses that to
provide a defense to the Act, that could require one analysis. Courts might need a
different analysis if that employee volunteers her prior salary in a negotiation
and the employer uses that to measure value, but the prior salary perpetuates
lower pay for women compared to men. Both of these analyses could be different
than in a situation where a potential employee reveals her prior salary in a nego-
tiation and that causes the employer to independently evaluate her experience
and skills. In the latter case, the employer would clearly have a defense to the Act
under a middle-ground approach.
167. See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 470–71 (McKeown, J., concurring) (citing Compensation
Discrimination in Violation of the Equal Pay Act, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) No.
915.003 at 10-IV (Dec. 5, 2000)).
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qualifications.”168 The EEOC interpretation of the Act as it relates to
prior salary aims to clarify the law and provide employers, courts, and
agencies with guidance for analyzing claims of compensation discrimi-
nation. The consistency between the EEOC and Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits further suggests that Judge McKeown’s middle-ground opin-
ion properly applied the Act to permit prior salary to be considered
only with other job-related factors. This approach clearly states the
law, addresses employers’ business needs, and furthers the Act’s pur-
pose of eliminating wage discrimination to a greater extent than the
majority’s categorical rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rizo majority’s interpretation of the “factor other than sex” ex-
ception to never include prior salary has contributed to the ongoing
debate over the Equal Pay Act’s ambiguous affirmative defense. The
gender wage gap has persisted since Congress passed the Act and,
without specific guidance from the Supreme Court, employers do not
know whether they may consider an employee’s prior salary in the
hiring process. Although the Rizo majority correctly analyzes the pur-
pose of the Act and the need to close the gender wage gap, its holding
goes too far. Rather, a middle-ground approach—such as the approach
Judge McKeown and the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have taken—
would eliminate confusion, forbid discriminatory use of prior salary
information, and empower women to negotiate higher salaries. In do-
ing so, this approach more successfully effectuates the Act’s purpose to
end wage discrimination. If uniformly adopted, it would clarify the law
and give employers flexibility to conduct business while executing the
Act’s mission of achieving equal pay for equal work. Notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s procedural decision to vacate and remand Rizo,
the substantive issue of whether prior salary is a factor other than sex
is ready for review and of critical importance to employers and their
female employees across the country.
168. Id.; see also Steven C. Kahn & Barbara Berish Brown, Equal Pay Act—Em-
ployer’s Defenses to Equal Pay Act Suit, LEGAL GUIDE TO HUM. RESOURCES § 16:82
(2018) (citing the EEOC Compliance Manual and explaining the EEOC argues
employers can offer higher pay to employees with more job-related factors that
would benefit its business, such as superior experience, training, and ability).
